Dr. Aradhana
Former Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy & Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, India
E-mail: aradhana.philosophy@gmail.com
Issue: Vol. 2 No. 3 (September 2026) – Anubodhan
Received: 22 September 2026 / Revised: 27 September / Accepted: 30 September 2026 / Published: 30 September 2026
DOI: https://doi.org/10.65885/anubodhan.v2n3.2026.130
Abstract
This paper examines the concept of moral judgment as a distinctive form of value judgment, situating it within the broader philosophical vocabulary of ethics. Drawing on classical and modern moral philosophers, including Mackenzie, Muirhead, Westermarck, McDougall, Russell, Sorley, Hobbes, and Kant, the paper argues that moral judgment is not merely descriptive but normative; it evaluates conduct against a standard of rightness rather than simply reporting fact. The discussion distinguishes moral judgment from factual and general judgments, and situates it within the broader category of value judgments alongside aesthetic and logical judgments. It further explores the debate over whether moral judgments originate in emotion or in rational classification, contrasting Westermarck’s emotivist account with the intellectualist position. The paper then identifies four implications carried by moral predicates such as “good” and “right”: value, obligatoriness, moral fittingness, and objective validity. It shows how these are unevenly present in everyday moral reasoning. Finally, it outlines the three postulates on which moral judgment depends: personality (the self as a self-conscious, self-determining agent), reason (the intuitive and discursive faculties that furnish moral knowledge), and self-determination (the freedom of will without which responsibility, merit, and blame become meaningless). The paper concludes that moral judgment is intelligible only on the assumption of a free, rational, self-aware agent capable of measuring action against an ideal standard.
Keywords: Moral judgment; Value judgment; Ethics; Normativity; Obligatoriness; Personality; Free will; Self-determination; Objective validity.
How to cite: Aradhana (2026). Understanding Moral Judgment: A Conceptual Inquiry. Anubodhan, 2(3), 346–355. https://doi.org/10.65885/anubodhan.v2n3.2026.130